Pro/con debate: In patients who are potential candidates for organ donation after cardiac death, starting medications and/or interventions for the sole purpose of making the organs more viable is an acceptable practice by Phua, Jason et al.
Page 1 of 4
(page number not for citation purposes)
Available online http://ccforum.com/content/11/2/211
Abstract
Several hospitals have been developing programmes for organ
donation after cardiac death. Such programmes offer options for
organ donation to patients who do not meet brain-death criteria but
wish to donate their organs after withdrawal of life-support. These
programmes also increase the available organ pool at a time when
demand exceeds supply. Given that potential donors are managed in
intensive care units, intensivists will be key components of these
programmes. Donation after cardiac death clearly carries a number
of important ethical issues with it. In the present issue of Critical
Care two established groups debate the ethical acceptability of
using medications/interventions in potential organ donors for the
sole purpose of making the organs more viable. Such debates will be
an increasingly common component of intensivists’ future practice.
The scenario
You are an intensivist in an institution that performs solid organ
transplantations. In an effort to provide patients and families
with increased opportunities to donate their organs, the
institution has recently developed a policy for donation after
cardiac death (DCD). With the new DCD policy, organ
donation is offered to patients and their families in a controlled
setting when death occurs immediately following the
withdrawal of life-support. Based on your understanding of
organ donation, you are aware there are certain medications
(for example, inotropes to maintain tissue perfusion) and certain
management practices that may allow the donated organs to
have better outcome. You wonder about the ethics of starting
interventions that will have no benefit to the dying patient but
will benefit the organs that are about to be donated.
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DCD = donation after cardiac death..
Pro: Antemortem interventions to improve organ viability in donation after cardiac death are
acceptable
Jason Phua and Tow Keang Lim
What medications and interventions are started in potential
donors before death for the sole purpose of making the
organs more viable in DCD, and how do they affect organ
function?
Firstly, inotropes and vasopressors are crucial for the
preservation of organ perfusion in patients in shock. The
majority of potential donors are hypotensive before cardiac
death [1], and hypotension worsens graft function [2].
Secondly, anticoagulants such as heparin decrease the risk
of thrombosis after the circulatory arrest and the negative
consequences on organ function. To maximize effectiveness,
heparin should ideally be administered before death into an
intact circulation for systemic distribution [3]. Experimental dataPage 2 of 4
(page number not for citation purposes)
Critical Care    Vol 11 No 2 Phua et al.
show preserved organ function with antemortem but not
postmortem heparin administration [4,5]. Thirdly, vasodilators
such as phentolamine may enhance organ blood flow and
lower the incidence of delayed renal graft function [6]. More
controversial practices are the administration of thrombolytics
and antemortem cannulation in preparation for the
administration of cold preservation solution.
Although rarely performed in Europe, these practices are
endorsed by major American and Canadian transplantation and
ethical guidelines [3,7-9]. Indeed, most American DCD centres
consider heparin administration at the time of withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment as the current standard of care [3,7].
The acceptability of these practices should be evaluated
according to Beauchamp and Childress’ four moral principles
[10]. As far as beneficence is concerned, none of these
practices benefit the donors, at least not physically, since
they will die regardless of the treatment provided. Most of the
opposition to these practices, however, stems from the
second principle of nonmaleficence. There is concern that
anticoagulants and thrombolytics may cause bleeding and
that vasodilators may cause hypotension – and therefore
hasten death. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that heparin
leads to sufficient bleeding after the withdrawal of life-
sustaining therapies to cause death [7]. The guidelines,
however, do state that heparin should only be used in
patients with low bleeding risks, and phentolamine should
only be used in patients without significant hypotension [3,8].
The most important moral principle in DCD, however, is
arguably that of autonomy [3,8]. If the potential donor or
his/her designate gives informed consent for these organ-
preserving measures with a clear understanding of their
possible side effects, who are healthcare professionals to
object? Critics point to the lack of large randomized
controlled trials to validate these measures. As the data
available are very suggestive, however, while we await these
trials (which may never be performed) the onus is on us to
institute these measures to prevent any organs from going to
waste. This is all the more crucial when one considers the last
moral principle of justice, and the fact that these organs are a
scarce resource.
To conclude, we believe that starting certain medications and
interventions such as inotropes, vasopressors, heparin and
phentolamine in potential donors for the sole purpose of
making the organs in DCD more viable is an acceptable
practice, provided they are used in patients with a low risk for
side effects and that informed consent is provided.
Con: The intended unintended and the principle of double effect
David A Zygun and Christopher J Doig
The ethical principle of the ‘rule of double effect’ provides
moral justification for the provision of certain forms of care at
the end of life that result in death [11]. A practical example of
this principle is the use of narcotics for pain relief, although
respiratory depression and death are potential consequen-
ces. Application of this principle requires all four conditions to
be met: the act must not belong to a category of acts
considered evil; the good effect (for the patient), and not the
bad effect, must be intended; the bad effect must not be a
means to the good effect; and there must be a proportionally
good reason for bringing about the bad effect [11,12]. This
principle has also been used to justify antemortem inter-
ventions in DCD, but do these interventions meet these
necessary elements? No, they do not.
The benefit of DCD is primarily to organ recipients and
society [13-15]. This is evident in the published literature,
where the common justification for DCD is to increase the
supply of organs. Furthermore, the organ most likely to be
recovered in DCD is the kidney, which will result in significant
cost savings to healthcare systems by removing a patient
from dialysis. Although there are some data that families may
gain benefit from DCD, such as avoidance of delayed regret
for missing the opportunity to donate organs [16] or the
desire that donation will ease their grief [17], these reasons
are also not for the benefit of the patient.
Is there potential harm to the donor (a hastening of death as
a primary consequence)? Antemortem intravenous heparin
and phentolamine are two interventions often considered.
Most DCD donors are individuals with neurological injury,
and heparin poses more than a theoretical risk of
precipitating or exacerbating intracranial haemorrhage and
hastening death. Phentolamine, a potent vasodilator, may
precariously decrease blood pressure and hasten
haemodynamic collapse in any ICU patient, and would be
particularly harmful in a patient with impaired cerebral
autoregulation. There are other interventions that might also
be considered, such as intravenous fluid administration to
maintain urine output (would this be acceptable if the patient
has concomitant hydrostatic pulmonary oedema?). Simply,
none of these interventions would be reasonably provided
outside the setting of DCD, all are credibly associated with
potential harm to the dying patient, and the perceived benefit
of DCD may be directly gained through the harm caused (a
more rapid death).
The principle of ‘double effect’ is suggested as an appro-
priate ethical framework to support antemortem interventions
in DCD donors. The requisite elements of this principle are
not met, and this principle cannot be used as a moral
justification. As such, antemortem interventions with a risk to
harm the patient violate the moral duty to ‘first do no harm’,Page 3 of 4
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and should not be condoned. Finally, invoking the principle of
double effect places this principle in jeopardy as a
reasonable justification for many appropriate interventions in
palliative care treatment; if this principle is brought into
disrepute, it may be harmful to palliative care patients, society
and the practice of medicine.
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Pro’s response: Involve Beauchamp and Childress’ moral principles, not the doctrine of double
effect
Jason Phua and Tow Keang Lim
Some argue that by facilitating a successful DCD such
antemortem interventions benefit the donor by fulfilling his/her
wishes, benefit the donor’s family by easing their grief, and
benefit the recipient [3,18]. Detractors denounce this inter-
pretation of the doctrine of double effect as medical
sophistry. We propose that instead of focusing on this
doctrine, these interventions should be evaluated according
to Beauchamp and Childress’ moral principles [10].
We reiterate that any bad effects of heparin and
phentolamine must not be exaggerated without medical
evidence. These interventions benefit DCD by improving
organ viability, not by causing ‘a more rapid death’.
Con’s response: The four tenets – out of tune
David A Zygun and Christopher J Doig
Violation of the principle of beneficence has been
acknowledged. With nonmaleficence, absence of evidence of
harm does not equal proof of absence of harm; the incidence
of harm from heparin is credible and has not been
systematically examined. A standard of practice to use
heparin without good clinical evidence of benefit and lacking
measurement of potential harm is not a credible argument.
Most potential DCD candidates are not competent to
consent. Families as proxy are not acting in the patient’s
autonomous interest in consenting to treatment that will not
benefit and may harm the patient, irrespective of benefit of
family or another third party (society, organ recipient).
Importantly, the statement ‘they will die regardless of the
treatment’ is not factual [19]. Finally, justice requires an equal
share of not only benefits, but also of burden. Given
premortem intervention requires the dying patient to solely
bear the burden; justice cannot be elicited to support such
interventions.
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